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I. INTRODUCTION
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of Florida handed down
fifteen opinions regarding diverse aspects of local government law. This
article surveys that body of decisional law. In particular, it reviews per-
tinent Florida Supreme Court decisions with regard to election law,
sovereign immunity, local government liability under section 1983, mu-
nicipal finance, preemption of local legislation, impact fees, county re-
sponsibility for indigent criminal defendants' appeals costs and munici-
pal liability for the attorneys' fees of public officials.1
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; J.S.D., Colum-
bia University School of Law, 1989; LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 1982;
J.D., New York University School of Law, 1974; B.A., Columbia University, 1970.
The author thanks David B. Earle for his capable research assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1. This article considers decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida handed down
between October 1, 1989 and July 15, 1991. It does not attempt to treat the local
government law decisions of the United States District Courts for Florida, of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit or of Florida courts other than
the Supreme Court. Similarly, it does not discuss Florida Supreme Court decisions in
non-local government areas that are substantively related to local government law only
1
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II. ELECTIONS
During the period of this survey, local election law received more
attention from the Florida Supreme Court than any other single aspect
of local government law. The court decided five cases in this field, on
matters ranging from the validity of referenda to special laws concern-
ing school board elections to the recall of municipal governing officials.
People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of
Leon2 concerned the validity of a local referendum that created a local-
option sales tax as the revenue source for a $60 million bond issue for
construction of a new jail and other capital improvements. Leon
County named People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement
(PATRM), a political action committee which had previously brought
two unsuccessful suits to set aside the result of the referendum, as de-
fendant in a bond validation proceeding. In that context, several chal-
lenges were raised to the referendum. One of these was based on the
contention that local government agencies had used public resources
and funds to mount an informational campaign in favor of the referen-
dum, thereby violating the "neutral forum" of the election.3 The su-
preme court soundly rejected this claim and stated that local govern-
ments are "not bound to keep silent in the face of a controversial vote
that will have profound consequences for the community."4 Rather, in
the court's view: "Leaders have both a duty and a right to say which
course of action they think best, and to make fair use of their offices for
this purpose." Any rule to the contrary would "render government
feckless" and would absolve democratic government of its "duty" to
"lead the people to make informed choices through fair persuasion.""
The supreme court also refused to credit an argument that by in-
cluding the campaign slogan "Take Charge . . . It's Your Future,"
and by describing planned capital improvements contemplated by the
referendum as "critical," the wording of the ballot language had un-
fairly biased the electorate.7 The supreme court indicated that the lan-
guage in question did reflect "a slight lack of neutrality that should not
insofar as one of the parties happened to be a political subdivision of the State of
Florida.
2. 583 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1991).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Leon, 583 So. 2d at 1376.
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be encouraged." 8 It concluded, however, that inasmuch as the remain-
der of the ballot plainly stated that a "yes" vote meant that new taxes
would be imposed, the referendum was not so confusing to the voters as
to be "clearly and conclusively defective."'
Finally, the supreme court gave short shrift to PATRM's notion
that the procedure established by section 102.168 of the Florida Stat-
utes, which requires that county canvassing boards be named defend-
ants in taxpayer lawsuits challenging elections, is the only proper
method of resolving challenges to local referenda. The court noted that
section 75.02 of the Florida Statutes authorizes counties to litigate the
validity of tax assessments levied in connection with bond issues. 10 It
also observed that section 100.321, Florida Statutes, plainly states that
the opportunity for taxpayers to file a lawsuit challenging a referendum
is closed as soon as a bond validation proceeding is filed in the same
matter." Thus, once taxpayers are joined as defendants in bond valida-
tion proceedings, they are obligated to raise all of their objections to
the validity of tax assessment referenda in the context of those proceed-
ings, or be "forever barred from raising them again."' 2
The supreme court considered the validity of another county refer-
endum election in Wadhams v. Board of County Commissioners."
There a majority of the voters of Sarasota County had approved an
amendment to the county charter providing that the county's Charter
Review Board shall conduct its business "only during the year, and
prior to that time, in which a general election is held in 1988, and
every four years thereafter."' This charter amendment appeared on
the ballot unaccompanied by any statement summarizing and explain-
ing it. Reversing rulings of the trial court and the Second District
Court of Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the results of
the referendum. It held that the proposed amendment had failed to
comply with section 101.161(1) of the Florida Statutes, which requires
that public measures submitted to votes of the people contain "an ex-
planatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief pur-
pose of the measure." 5 Citing the leading case of Askew v. Firestone,6
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Leon, 583 So. 2d at 1378.
13. 567 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (1991)).
1991]
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the supreme court opined that the purpose of section 101.161(1) is to
assure that the electorate is advised of the true meaning and ramifica-
tions of a proposed amendment."7 By failing to contain an explanatory
statement of the amendment, the ballot at issue in Wadhams had failed
to inform the public that there was presently no restriction on Charter
Review Board meetings and that the chief purpose of the amendment
was to curtail the Charter Review Board's right to meet. 8 This was not
apparent from the face of the ballot.19
The supreme court disagreed with the Sarasota County Board of
County Commissioners' argument that public hearings, advance publi-
cation of the proposed amendment, and media publicity had afforded
the voters of Sarasota County an "ample opportunity" to become in-
formed on the amendment's effect. Instead, the court indicated, the
ballot summary must bear the burden of informing the public-a bur-
den that should not fall only on the press and opponents of the
proposal.2 0
Similarly, the court rejected the county commissioners' contention
that approval by the voters cures any defects in the form of the submis-
sion. It reasoned the defect in the referendum at issue "went to the
very heart of what section 101.161(1) seeks to preclude" and that "no
one can say with any certainty what the vote of the electorate would
have been if the voting public had been given the whole truth.'
Finally, the court refused to credit the proposition that challenges
to allegedly defective referenda are barred if they are instituted subse-
quent to a special election. It indicated that, in effect, that argument
asserts that "hoodwinking the public is permissible unless the action is
challenged prior to the election" and stated "although there would
come a point where laches would preclude an attack on the ordinance,
such is not the situation in the present case where the suit was filed
only a few weeks after the election. '"22
Justice Kogan dissented. In his opinion, the language of the ballot
in question did advise the electorate of the meaning and ramifications
of the amendment, particularly in light of the advance publicity that
16. 420 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982).
17. Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 416.
18. Id. at 416-17.
19. Id. at 417.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 417.
[Vol. 16
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the referendum had received." In this case, Justice Kogan believed, the
election was properly conducted and the petitioners had received suffi-
cient advance notice of the proposed ballot to allow them to challenge
its form before the election. Their failure to do so should bar their
claim."'
In re Koretsky" involved the issue of whether section 100.361 of
the Florida Statutes applies to a municipality that has adopted no pro-
visions for recall elections. The statutory section contains a comprehen-
sive scheme for the recall of governing officials of municipalities and
charter counties. Inter alia, it states: "the provisions of this act shall
apply to cities and charter counties which have adopted recall
provisions."2 6
After briefly reviewing pertinent legislative history, the supreme
court gave this statutory language a narrow reading. It stated that "the
only conclusion we can draw from this inclusion is that the legislature
was limiting the recall procedure to those governing bodies that pro-
vided for recall and declined to impose it on such bodies which have no
such provisions. '127
Justice Grimes dissented on the view that the legislation at issue
should be read more broadly. Grimes pointed out that other subsections
of the same statute provide that "it is the intent of the Legislature that
the recall procedures . . . shall be uniform statewide" and that the act
authorizes and provides for voter recall of "any member of the gov-
erning body of a municipality. 12 8 In view of these sub-sections, he con-
cluded that the statute was clearly intended to operate, in and of itself,
as authorization for the removal of members of municipal governing
bodies. 9
Justice Grimes' dissent stated one additional concern. He believed
that the majority's reading of section 100.361 would permit cities that
presently have municipal recall procedures to repeal those procedures
at any time, simply to escape the potential for a recall of their gov-
erning officials. In Grimes' opinion, that scenario would be contrary to
the public interest. Thus, he viewed the majority's approach as incon-
23. Id. at 423 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. 557 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990).
26. hi. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 100.361(9) (1987)).
27. Koretsky, 557 So. 2d at 25.
28. Id. (Grimes, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
1991]
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sistent with the maxim that statutory ambiguities should be resolved by
interpretations that best serve the public interest."0
In Kane v. Robbins,"' the Florida Supreme Court declined to over-
turn its earlier holding, in the same case, that non-chartered county
school board members may not be elected in a non-partisan election
authorized by special law.32 The incumbent Martin County School
Board moved for rehearing or clarification of the supreme court's origi-
nal decision in the case, arguing that opinion would invalidate all acts
and decisions of the School Board since 1976, and would impair the
delivery of educational services to Martin County children until a new
school board election is held. 33 The supreme court dismissed these con-
cerns as unfounded. It pointed out that the official acts of a de facto
officer are as valid and binding upon the public and third persons as are
the acts of an officer de jure. Thus, the lawfulness of the acts of Martin
County School Board members who had been elected in invalid non-
partisan elections could not be doubted. Moreover, the court concluded,
official acts of the incumbent school board members would continue to
be valid until such time as new school board members are duly
appointed.3
The 1989 Kane v. Robbins decision was also considered in another
case involving the validity of a non-partisan election of county school
board members, School Board of Palm Beach County v. Winchester. 6
In that situation, Palm Beach County had been electing school board
members in non-partisan elections since 1971, pursuant to a special act
of the Florida legislature. In 1985, the County adopted a charter pro-
viding that the validity of any pre-existing county ordinances shall con-
tinue as if the charter had not been passed. Following the Kane deci-
sion, Palm Beach County sought a declaratory judgment that its
method of electing school board members was valid. The county con-
tended that because it had become a charter county, it was subject to
the exception contained in article III, section 1 l(a)(1) of the Florida
Constitution which exempts, inter alia, chartered counties from the
prohibition on special laws pertaining to the election of officers. 36 The
30. Id.
31. 556 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1990).
32. Id. at 1385. This original Kane v. Robbins decision is summarized in Joel A.
Mintz, Local Government Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 919, 930 (1990).
33. Id. at 1381.
34. Id.
35. 565 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1990).
36. Id.
[Vol. 16
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Florida Supreme Court agreed, noting that it was obligated to construe
statutes as constitutional wherever such a construction was reasonably
possible. Consequently, the court found that it was reasonable to up-
hold Palm Beach County's school board election system because it was
not challenged prior to Palm Beach County's becoming a chartered
county, and because its provisions are presently constitutional under ar-
ticle III, section 11 (a). The Kane case was distinguished because it had
not involved a chartered county.37
Justices Ehrlich and Grimes dissented in separate opinions. Justice
Ehrlich reasoned that the statute that authorized non-partisan county
school board elections in Palm Beach County was unconstitutional at
its inception and that the adoption of a charter "does not in some mys-
terious, mystical manner make it constitutional." 8 Referring to the
majority's opinion as "judicial legerdemain" and "bad law," Ehrlich
stated,
the travesty of the whole scenario is that now that the county is
chartered it no longer needs to rely on special acts of the legislature
to bring about non-partisan elections of the school board. The
county itself has the authority to enact such a provision as the one
at issue. Yet it has never done so. 39
Justice Grimes indicated that even though he could sympathize
with the majority's "unspoken desire" to avoid disrupting an impending
school board election in Palm Beach County, he saw no rational basis
for doing: so. 40 He wrote: "I know of no legal theory by which it could
be said that the adoption of the home rule charter breathed life into the
constitutionally invalid special law. "41
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two
cases with regard to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Its first deci-
sion concerned the pre-judgment interest liability of local governments
and its second involved their post-judgment liability for interest
payments.
37. 1d. at 1351.
38. Id. at 1352 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Winchester, 565 So. 2d at 1353 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
1991]
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In Broward County v. Finlayson,2 the sovereign immunity issue
arose in the context of a labor contract dispute between the county and
its emergency medical technician (EMT) employees. These employees
had entered into a contract that provided for a regular work week of
fifty-six hours, with overtime rates to be paid for all hours worked in
excess of scheduled shifts. At the same time, the county's civil service
rules, written for all county employees, stated in pertinent part that
"Overtime is work beyond the normal hours of any scheduled work
week. After forty (40) hours actually worked employee[s] will be paid
at the rate of time and one-half.' 4
After an unsuccessful grievance proceeding, the plaintiff filed a
class action on behalf of herself and other EMT's seeking overtime pay
for work done in excess of forty hours per week." At trial, a jury found
that the EMT's annual salary was payment for only forty hours per
week and judgment was entered providing that each class member was
owed retroactive overtime pay for the entire period of the labor con-
tract in question.'8
On appeal, Broward County argued that sovereign immunity pro-
hibits an award of pre-judgment interest against a subdivision of the
state in a contract dispute.46 The supreme court was not persuaded.
Affirming, in part, a decision of the district court, the court relied on
Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections'7 for the princi-
ple that the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state
from action for breach of a contract it has entered into, so long as that
contract is fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law.48
The supreme court then considered whether Broward County
should be required to pay the plaintiff pre-judgment interest from the
date that the contract was entered into or the date of the plaintiff's first
claim for overtime wages. Noting that the County had been unaware
that the EMT's believed themselves entitled to sixteen hours of over-
time per week until the date of the plaintiff's first demand for overtime
compensation, the court ruled that it would be inequitable to allow the
plaintiff to recover pre-judgment interest for any period prior to that
42. 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1211-12.
45. Id. at 1212.
46. Id.
47. 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1984).
48. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d at 1213.
[Vol. 16
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date.49
In dissent, Justice McDonald took the view that under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, the state and its political subdivisions should
not be liable for interest on its debts unless that liability is called for
specifically by a statute or a contract.50 Finding no statutory authoriza-
tion for suits against the state for breach of employment contracts, Mc-
Donald concluded that no interest on the unpaid overtime was due the
plaintiff.5
Palm Beach County v. Town of Palm Beach52 concerned a dispute
over the sufficiency of county property tax levies for roads and bridges.
After winning a judgment that the county's levies were insufficient, the
Town appealed a trial court remedial order that made no allowance for
post judgment interest. 53 It relied on section 55.03 of the Florida Stat-
utes which provides that, in general, judgments or decrees entered on
or after October 1, 1981 shall bear interest at the rate of twelve per-
cent a year.54 The supreme court agreed with the Town. Rejecting an
argument that section 55.03 was inapplicable because interest may only
be awarded when the right to interest can be implied from the lan-
guage of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the court held that
the county's immunity from suit had been established in an early phase
of the suit and could not be relitigated.55
Justice Overton dissented. He opined that, when the legislature
passed section 55.03, it had not intended to apply post-judgment inter-
est to disputes of this type between governmental entities. 56 In Justice
Overton's view, Palm Beach County had been exercising a governmen-
tal function, and acting in a legislative capacity, when it levied tax as-
sessments in the manner it did. 57 Thus, even if it had been wrong, the
county was not properly subject to a claim of postjudgment interest.
Such a result, he believed, is punitive to taxpayers, who must pay the
county's interest costs along with any assessments levied for road and
bridge purposes. 58
49. id.
50. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1214.
52. 579 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1991).
53. Id.
54. FLA. STAT. § 55.03(1) (1991).
55. Palm Beach, 579 So. 2d at 720.
56. Id. at 721.
57. Id.
58. Id.
1991]
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IV. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY
During the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of
Florida handed down two opinions regarding the liability of municipali-
ties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One of these cases concerned state trial
courts' subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 suits against mu-
nicipalities. The other case focused on the circumstances in which
subordinate municipal officials may be held to have been delegated fi-
nal municipal policy-making authority.
In Town of Lake Clarke Shores v. Page," a former police officer
with the Lake Clarke Shores Police Department brought a section 1983
action against the town. He alleged that his civil rights had been vio-
lated because town officials had terminated his employment in response
to a letter, published in the Palm Beach Post, in which Page had ex-
pressed his opinion about the effect of stress upon police officers.60
The trial court dismissed the action, holding that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over section 1983 actions. The Fourth District
Court of Appeals reversed and the Florida Supreme Court unanimously
agreed with the Court of Appeals.6 Quoting extensively from a recent
United States Supreme Court decision, Howlett v. Rose,6" the Florida
Supreme Court held that state trial courts do, in fact, have subject
matter jurisdiction over section 1983 actions against municipalities.
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that
municipal corporations and similar governmental entities are "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983.6 Furthermore, state courts which
entertain section 1983 suits against such entities are bound to accept
Congress' abrogation of municipal sovereign immunity in those
actions."
In Raben-Pastal v. City of Coconut Creek,65 the plaintiffs brought
a section 1983 action against the city based upon the failure of its chief
building official to lift a stop-work order he had issued as to plaintiff's
residential construction project. The plaintiffs had eliminated a number
of cracks in newly constructed structures, as they had been ordered to
do by the building official, and an engineering firm retained by the City
59. 569 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 1990).
60. Id. at 1257.
61. Id. at 1256.
62. 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990).
63. Id. at 2432.
64. Page, 569 So. 2d at 1257.
65. 573 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1990).
[Vol. 16
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had certified that the necessary repairs were completed. Despite this,
the building official refused to rescind his stop-work order for another
five months. 6
Following a trial in which a jury had returned a sizeable verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs, the trial court set aside the jury verdict and dis-
missed the suit. The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's action and the Florida Supreme Court agreed. 7
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court considered whether the
building officials' actions had established official city policies. It dis-
cussed two leading United States Supreme Court opinions, Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati,68 and City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik9 and cited
Prapotnik for the principle that, in a section 1983 action, the discre-
tionary actions of a subordinate local official will not be deemed to con-
stitute an official municipal policy unless it is clear that the
subordinate's discretionary decision was not constrained by official poli-
70cies and was not subject to review.
Applying that rule to the facts, the court noted that the South
Florida Building Code, which governs the regulation of construction
projects in Broward County, vests building officials with the power to
impose stop-work orders on particular projects. However, the same
Code also provides that any decision made by the building official on
matters regulated by the Code was subject to review by a Board of
Rules and Appeals, upon written application to the Secretary of the
Board. For this reason, a decision by a building official affecting a stop-
work order was not "final," and the building official whose actions were
challenged in this case could not be considered a "final policy-maker"
for the City of Coconut Creek.7
V. MUNICIPAL FINANCE
In its last two terms, the Supreme Court of Florida considered two
appeals from judicial validations of municipal bond financing
agreements.
State v. School Board of Sarasota County72 concerned the valid-
66. Id. at 299.
67. Id. at 298.
68. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
69. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
70. Coconut Creek, 573 So. 2d at 301.
71. Id. at 302.
72. 561 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1990).
1991]
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ity of nearly identical agreements supporting bond issues that had been
entered into by the school boards of Sarasota, Collier and Orange
Counties. The court summarized the agreements in question as follows:
These agreements provide for the lease of public lands owned by
the [school] boards to not-for-profit entities (by way of ground
leases), the construction of improvement of public educational fa-
cilities upon the leased lands, the annual leaseback of the facilities
to the school boards (by way of facilities leases), and the convey-
ance of the lease rights of the not-for-profit entities to trustees (by
way of trust agreements). The trustees are to market the bonds and
disburse funds to finance construction of the facilities. Title to the
public lands remains in the respective school boards. Title to the
facilities constructed with the proceeds of the bonds passes to the
respective school boards at the end of the term of the ground lease
Money from several sources, including ad valorem taxation,
will be used to make the annual facilities' lease payments. If, in
any year, a board does not appropriate money to pay the lease, the
board's obligations terminate without penalty and it cannot be
compelled to make payments. The board then has two options. It
may purchase the facilities and terminate the ground lease. Alter-
natively, it may surrender possession of the facilities and lands for
the remainder of the ground lease and is free to substitute other
facilities for those surrendered. The trustee may relet the facilities
for the remainder of the lease's term or sell its interest in the leases
to generate revenue to pay bondholders.7 3
Challenging the validity of these agreements, the State of Florida
asserted that the trustees and not-for-profit entities that they refer to
were not authorized to seek validation of the agreements in proceedings
pursuant to section 75.02 of the Florida statutes.7 ' The state contended
that while the benefits of chapter 75 validation proceedings are prop-
erly conferred on political subdivisions of the state, in this case it was
really the not-for-profit entities and the trustees, rather than the school
boards, who were employing chapter 75 procedures to obtain judicial
approval of the bond financing arrangements. Citing its decision in
State v. Brevard County,75 the supreme court disagreed.7 ' The court
73. Id. at 550-51.
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id.
76. 539 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1989).
[Vol. 16
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summarily found that the boards were, in fact, proper plaintiffs in a
section 75.02 action."
The supreme court then considered whether a voter referendum
was required with respect to the agreements at issue. It ruled that even
though the agreements were partially supported by ad valorem reve-
nues, a referendum was not mandated by article VII, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution because the agreements specified that "neither the
bondholders nor anyone else could compel use of the ad valorem taxing
power to service the bonds."7 8
Similarly, the court rejected the contention that a referendum was
mandated by section 230.23(9)(b)(5) of the Florida Statutes which re-
quires an approving referendum where a school board pays rental fees,
for necessary grounds and educational facilities, from funds received
from ad valorem taxation pursuant to an agreement for a period
greater than twelve months.79 As interpreted by the supreme court, this
section amounts to "no more than a codification of the referendum re-
quirement set forth in the constitution." 80
Finally, the court declined to apply other cases in which it had
reversed bond validations by lower courts. It distinguished County of
Volusia v. State81 on the basis that the obligations at issue in Volu-
sia-supported as they were by a pledge of all legally available unen-
cumbered revenues other than ad valorem taxation, along with a prom-
ise to maintain fully the programs and services that generated the non-
ad valorem revenue-constituted, in effect, a promise to levy ad
valorem taxes. 82 The supreme court also distinguished Nohrr v. Bre-
vard County Educational Facilities Authority,83 in which it held that
the predecessor to article VIII, section 12 required an approving refer-
endum for a bond-supporting agreement which granted a mortgage
with a right of foreclosure. In contrast, the court reasoned, the present
case did not involve a mortgage with right of foreclosure. Moreover, in
this case, the bondholders were "limited to lease remedies; and the an-
nual renewal option preserved the school board's full budgetary
flexibility.'84
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. FLA. STAT. § 230.23(9)(b)(5) (1989).
80. School Bd., 561 So. 2d at 553.
81. 417 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1982).
82. School Bd., 561 So. 2d at 553.
83. 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971).
84. School Bd., 561 So. 2d at 553.
1991]
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice McDonald labeled the majority's
conclusion that the financial scheme in question was not supported by a
pledge of ad valorem taxation as "pure sophistry" and an approval of
"form over substance. ' 85 McDonald noted that "if ad valorem taxes
are not levied and paid each year for the duration of the agreements,*
the school boards default not only all interest acquired under the agree-
ment for the remainder of the agreement, but they also lose the right to
use the preowned property for the remainder of the agreement."88 In
practice, he reasoned, no school board would do that. Thus, for all
practical purposes, the school boards in this case bound themselves to
levy, collect and pay ad valorem taxes to finance new school construc-
tion-an arrangement which requires approval by referendum under
the Florida Constitution.8
In State v. City of Orlando,88 the Florida Supreme Court consid-
ered an entirely different municipal bond financing scheme. There, the
state challenged the validity of a $500 million bond issue, the proceeds
from which would be used to make loans to, or buy the debt instru-
ments of, other local governmental units in the State of Florida.89
Under the arrangement in question, bond revenues could be lent by the
City of Orlando to finance a variety of local agency projects, including
the purchase of liability coverage contracts, the funding of self-insur-
ance reserves and the building of roads, water systems, jails, utility fa-
cilities, and sports facilities. 90 While local agencies were to be liable to
the extent of their respective obligations under the loan agreements, the
bonds themselves were not to be deemed "a debt liability or obligation
of the state or any political subdivision or municipality." 91
The Florida Supreme Court found this municipal financing ar-
rangement to be flawed in two critical respects. First, the proposed
bond issue "failed to provide enough details by which its legality could
be measured." 92 It did not identify the particular governmental entities
to whom bond revenues would be lent, the revenues from which those
entities would repay their loans or the specific projects or uses to which
85. Id. at 554.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 576 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1991).
89. Id. at 1316.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1317.
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bond funds would be put.93 In addition, the proposed financing arrange-
ment neglected to estimate the amount of profits that the City of Or-
lando might expect.9 Also, it failed to mention what "paramount pub-
lic purpose" those profits would be used for.95
Beyond this lack of specificity-which the supreme court conceded
could probably be corrected by amendment of the documents that con-
trolled issuance of the bonds-the court noted a second and "deeper"
problem. The primary purpose of the bond issue in question "was to
obtain proceeds that would be used to invest for a profit."96 In the
court's opinion, this purpose contravened article VIII, section 2(b) of
the Florida Constitution, which limits municipalities to the conduct of
municipal government, the performance of municipal functions and the
rendering of municipal services.9 In the court's view, "making a profit
on an investment is an aspect of commerce more properly left to com-
mercial banking and business entities."98 For this reason, the supreme
court invalidated the City of Orlando's proposed bond issue. 99 The
court held, however, that its ruling was prospective only, and that "it
did not prohibit the investment of bond proceeds pending later expendi-
tures on the project contemplated by a bond issue." 100 The court also
indicated that its opinion should not be construed to limit the ability of
municipalities to invest any previously borrowed funds used for valid
municipal projects.101
VI. STATE PREEMPTION OF LOCAL LEGISLATION
Florida Power Corporation v. Seminole County0 2 concerned the
validity of county and city ordinances that required Florida Power Cor-
poration (FPC) to relocate underground a set of overhead power lines
that FPC maintained along a two lane county road. The city's ordi-
nance required FPC to bear the entire cost of the undergrounding pro-
93. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317.
94. ld.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
98. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317 (quoting State v. Panama City Beach,
529 So. 2(1 250, 257 (Fla. 1988) (McDonald, C.J., dissenting)).
99. See City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d at 1317.
100. Id. at 1310.
101. Id.
102. 579 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991).
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ject. The county's ordinance was nominally silent as to who would bear
that cost. However, it unequivocally declared that the county would not
do so."0 '
FPC sued the city and county for declaratory judgment and in-
junctive relief against enforcement of the ordinance, contending that
the ordinances invade the exclusive authority of the state Public Ser-
vice Commission to regulate rates and service. The utility company was
unsuccessful at the trial court level, but the Florida Supreme Court
reversed. 104 Noting that the Florida Statutes grant the state Public Ser-
vice Commission broad power "to prescribe fair and reasonable rates
and charges, ' 10 5 and that requiring FPC to place its power lines under-
ground clearly affects its rates, if not its service, the court held that
"the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission ...preempts the
authority of the city and county to require FPC to place its lines
underground. 10 6
The supreme court gave a narrow construction to section
337.403(1) of the Florida Statutes. That section provides that utility
equipment placed along public roads that is found to interfere unrea-
sonably with "the convenient, safe, or continuous use, or the mainte-
nance, improvement, extension, or expansion, of such public road,"
shall be "removed or relocated" by the utility at its own expense107
The court held that this provision "does not grant localities the power
to mandate the type of system to be used by a utility, or to determine
who should pay for such a system."' 0 8 However, it does allow "for the
removal or relocation of utility facilities when necessary to accommo-
date expansion or maintenance."1 09 In addition, the court opined that
the statutory words "removed or relocated" do not suggest conversion
of an overhead electric system to an underground system as a condition
of use of the right of way-a requirement which the court described as
"extraordinary." 10
Finally, the supreme court observed that the legislature had vested
the Public Service Commission with the authority to require conversion
103. Id.
104. Id. at 106.
105. Florida Power Corp., 579 So. 2d at 106 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. §
366.05(1) (West Supp. 1991)).
106. Id. at 107.
107. Id. at 108 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN § 337.403(1) (1991)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Florida Power Corp., 579 So. 2d at 108.
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of overhead distribution lines to underground lines if the Commission
believes that such a conversion would be "feasible" and "cost effec-
tive." 1 In view of this, the court reasoned, permitting cities to man-
date unilaterally the conversion of overhead lines would run "contrary
to the legislative intent that the Public Service Commission have exclu-
sive regulatory authority over this subject."11
VII. IMPACT FEES
Si. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Association1
concerned the validity of an impact fee on new residential construction
to be used for new school construction.114 The impact fee ordinance
was immediately applicable in unincorporated areas of St. Johns
County. However, it was ineffective within the boundaries of any mu-
nicipality in the county until that municipality entered into an interlo-
cal agreement with the county to collect the impact fees from appli-
cants for new building permits.
In reviewing the constitutionality of this ordinance, the supreme
court applied a "dual rational nexus test," which it explained as
follows:
[Tihe local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection,
or rational nexus, between the need for additional capital facilities
and the growth in population generated by the subdivision. In addi-
tion, the government must show a reasonable connection, or ra-
tional nexus, between the expenditures of the funds collected and
the benefits accruing to the subdivision.'1
The court had little difficulty concluding that the ordinance in question
satisfied the first prong of this test."' The court rejected as "simplistic"
a contention the "impact fee [was] nothing more than a tax" insofar as
it concerned the many new residences that would have no impact on
the public school system. During the useful life of the new dwelling
units subject to the fees, the court noted, school age children would
111. Id.; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.04(7)(a) (Supp. 1991).
112. Id.
113. 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991).
114. Id. at 636.
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id. at 638.
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come and go. 17 The St. Johns County impact fee, which was based
upon a comprehensive study of projected growth and educational de-
mands, was rationally designed to provide the capacity to serve the
educational needs of all new dwelling units." 8
The supreme court then turned to the second prong of the dual
rational nexus test. It observed that, as written, the impact fee "ordi-
nance permitted the St. Johns County School Board to spend the funds
to build a new school that would serve only the increased needs of a
municipality caused by growth within that municipality.""' However,
unless the municipality had signed an interlocal agreement with the
county to collect impact fees, the funds to build that school would come
from impact fees paid by development in unincorporated areas. This
arrangement ran afoul of the requirement that the expenditure of col-
lected impact fees be reasonably connected to the benefits that accrue
to the units those fees are collected from. For this reason, the court
mandated that no impact fee be collected under the ordinance until
such time that municipalities containing "substantially all" of the mu-
nicipal population of St. Johns County have entered into interlocal
agreements with the county. 120
Since the propriety of imposing impact fees to finance new schools
was an issue of first impression in Florida, the supreme court went on
to examine other issues raised by the St. Johns County impact fee ordi-
nance in dicta. It ruled that a subsection of the ordinance that created
an alternative method of fee calculation collided with the requirement
of the Florida Constitution that there be a uniform system of "free
public schools."'' As construed by the county, this provision created
the potential that impact fees would in fact become user fees to be paid
primarily by those households that actually contain public school chil-
dren. However, the court severed the offending subsection under a sev-
erability clause of the ordinance, since its severance did not impair the
operation or effectiveness of the remainder of the ordinance. 2
The supreme court rejected an argument that the ordinance con-
flicts with the requirement of a "uniform system" of public schools con-
117. Id. at 637-38.
118. Northeast Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d at 638.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id. at 638.
122. Id. at 640.
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tained in article IX, section 1 of the Florida Constitution.12 S It opined
that the Constitution mandates neither uniform sources of school fund-
ing among the several counties nor equal funding and equivalent educa-
tional programs in every school district. "Inherent inequities, such as
varying revenues because of higher or lower property values or differ-
ences in millage assessments, will always favor or disfavor some dis-
tricts."" "' The Constitution only requires that every student be provided
an equal chance to achieve basic educational goals prescribed by the
legislature.1 25
Similarly, the supreme court rejected claims that the impact fee
ordinance interjected the county into an area in which school boards
have been given exclusive authority. It stated that article IX, section
4(b) of the Florida Constitution, that gives school boards the authority
to tax, does not limit county involvement in school financing. Further-
more, section 230.23 of the Florida Statutes, which implements article
IX, section 4(b), does not place upon school boards the exclusive duty
to secure adequate public school financing. Moreover, several other en-
actments make clear that the legislature contemplated that counties be
involved in educational funding, rather than preempted from such
involvement.12 6
Finally, the court concluded that the ordinance in question does
not create an unlawful delegation of power. In its view, the ordinance
properly calls for the county to make the fundamental policy decisions,
including determinations as to the amount of the fees and how they are
to be collected, at the same time as it limits the school board's discre-
tion in expending funds for new educational facilities. 27
VIII. COUNTY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS' APPEALS COSTS
In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Ju-
dicial Circuit Public Defender'28 was a consolidation of five cases in
which six Florida counties challenged an order of the Second District
Court of' Appeal regarding the prosecution of criminal appeals by the
123. Northeast Fla. Builders Assn, 583 So. 2d at 640.
124. Id. at 641.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 642.
127. Id.
128. 561 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
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Public Defender for the Tenth Judicial Circuit. This order was issued
sua sponte by the Second District Court in response to a tremendous
backlog of appeals to that court by indigent defendants in which briefs
were substantially overdue.M The principal requirements of the order
in question were summarized by the supreme court in this way:
The court's order prohibits Mr. Moorman, [the Public Defender
for the Tenth Judicial District], from accepting appeals from any
judicial circuit other than the Tenth in which the notice of appeal
was filed after May 22, 1989. The order further mandates that cir-
cuit judges within each circuit appoint that circuit's public de-
fender to handle appeals from that circuit. If a public defender
from one of those circuits has a conflict, the order requires that
they [sic] file motions to withdraw so that the circuit judge may
appoint other counsel to represent those clients at the expense of
the local government. 180
The counties challenged this order on several grounds. First, they
argued that the order abridged their due process rights because the
counties were not afforded notice or an opportunity to be heard before
the order was issued, even though it will have a substantial financial
impact on them. The supreme court was unpersuaded. It noted that the
order under review was "merely the most recent in a series of efforts"
by the same court to deal with the same problem.131 "All interested
parties, including the counties, [had] been given an opportunity to re-
spond" in connection with at least two of these prior efforts. 32 The
issues remained the same, as did the counties' response. Beyond this,
the court reaffirmed and reiterated its decision, in Escambia County v.
Behr,33 that counties are not entitled to respond to motions to with-
draw by public defenders merely because of their financial interest in
the outcome of those motions.'
The counties also contended that the state should compensate pri-
vate attorneys who must be appointed as a result of conflicts of interest
created by state's underfunding of public defenders. 33 They suggested
129. Id. at 1131.
130. Id. at 1132-33.
131. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1133.
132. Id.
133. 384 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1980).
134. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1135-36.
135. Id. at 1135.
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that the state had, in fact, assumed that burden in 1981, when the
legislature deleted language from section 27.53(2) of the Florida Stat-
utes that tied the payment of court-appointed attorneys in non-capital
cases to a statute addressing payment of such attorneys in capital
cases.133 Once again, the supreme court disagreed. It stated that even
though the amendment to section 27.53(2) had indeed removed lan-
guage explicitly placing the burden of compensating court-appointed
attorneys on the counties in non-capital cases, no language was added
assigning that responsibility to the state. As a result, the remaining
statute left an ambiguity to be resolved by examination of the legisla-
tive history of the 1981 amendment to section 27.53(2).131
The court performed such an examination, including an analysis of
the jurisdiction of the legislative committees which considered the bill
that amended section 27.53(2), and a review of a staff analysis of that
bill prepared for the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee. It revealed
that the bill was not intended to shift the responsibility for compensat-
ing court appointed attorneys from the counties to the state. Therefore,
the supreme court reasoned, that obligation remains on the counties.'3 8
In support of this conclusion, the court cited section 925.037 of the
Florida Statutes,139 which created a pilot program to reimburse the
counties for fees paid to court-appointed counsel in capital and non-
capital conflict of interest cases. It stated:
This new statute is good evidence that the legislature views the pri-
mary responsibility for compensating court-appointed attorneys as
being on the counties, that the 1981 amendment to subsection
27.53(2) did not alter that scheme, and that the legislature is only
now beginning to address the tremendous financial burden the
scheme places on the counties. 40
The supreme court further observed that appropriation of funds of
the operation of government is a legislative function and that the judi-
ciary cannot compel the legislature to exercise a purely legislative pre-
rogative."' Thus, even though the counties may well be correct in as-
serting that the state should accept complete financial responsibility for
136. Id. at 1135-36.
137. Id. at 1137.
138. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d at 1135-36.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1137-38.
141. Id. at 1138.
1991]
21
Mintz: Local Government
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
the public defenders, the legislature is the proper forum to address that
concern.
142
IX. ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR REPRESENTATION OF CITY
OFFICIALS
Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach" involved claims by three
members of the Fort Walton Beach City Council for reimbursement of
attorney's fees expended for their private representation in matters
arising from their actions as council members. The officials had suc-
cessfully brought an action to enjoin a recall petition calling for their
removal from office. They had also defended against a federal civil
rights claim which had been dismissed by the plaintiff, with prejudice,
as part of a settlement in which the plaintiff received some relief. Re-
versing the trial court and the First District Court of Appeal, the su-
preme court held that the city council members were entitled to reim-
bursement of their attorney's fees."'
With respect to their lawsuit to enjoin the recall petition, the court
agreed with the lower courts that the council members could not re-
cover attorney's fees under section 111.07 of the Florida Statutes, a
provision that is limited to reimbursing the attorney's fees of governing
officials who are prevailing defendants. 1 5 Notwithstanding this, how-
ever, the supreme court ruled that the council members were entitled to
recover their attorney's fees under common law." 6
The court cited a line of decisions that establish that public offi-
cials have a common law right to legal representation, at public ex-
pense, to defend themselves against litigation arising from the perform-
ance of their official duties while serving a public purpose. It stated
that for public officials to be entitled to such publicly financed legal
representation, two conditions must be satisfied: 1) the litigation in
question must arise out of or in connection with the performance of
their officials duties and 2) the litigation must serve a public purpose. 7
Applying this principle to the facts, the supreme court concluded
that the council members' lawsuit to enjoin the recall petition met both
142. Id.
143. 568 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1990).
144. Id. at 919.
145. FLA. STAT. § 111.07 (West Supp. 1991).
146. Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 918.
147. Id. at 917.
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of the requisite requirements. Because the recall petition was a re-
sponse to the council members' dismissal of Fort Walton Beach's city
manager and police chief, the court found it sufficiently connected to
the council members' official performance to satisfy the first prong of
the test.1"8
In addition, in the court's view, the council members' action in
defending against the recall petition served useful public purposes.
Their lawsuit ensured the effective and efficient functioning of the city's
governing body, and protected city offices from untimely and illegal re-
call petitions. The court reasoned that officials should not have to incur
personal expenses to insure that a recall committee follows proper pro-
cedures.'4 9 Even though the case presented an "unusual twist," in that
the council members initiated the litigation in question, rather than de-
fending against it, the actions of those officials amounted to a defense
against an improper recall petition. 15 Thus, they should not be pre-
cluded from recovering their attorney's fees under common law.' 6 '
The supreme court also concluded that the common law doctrine
that served as the substantive basis for the council members' recovery
was not superseded by section 111.07.152 It noted that the statute itself
was silent as to whether it superseded the common law, and that there
was nothing in the legislative history of the statute that supported an
implication that the common law was being derogated. Applying the
well established principle that a statute will not be held to change the
common law unless that statute explicitly and clearly exhibits an intent
to do so, the court held that section 111.07 is not the exclusive mecha-
nism authorizing an award of attorney's fees to public officials involved
in litigation arising from the performance of their public duties. 5 '
The supreme court then turned to the council members' claim of
attorney's fees for their defense of a federal civil rights suit against
them by the former police chief of Fort Walton Beach. 54 That action
had resulted in a settlement which called for the plaintiff to voluntarily
dismiss his claim, with prejudice. In exchange, the plaintiff was rein-
stated as police chief, placed on permanent disability leave, reimbursed
148. Id.
149. Id. at 917-18.
150. Id. at 918.
151. Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 918.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 919.
154. Id.
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his past lost wages, and given a pledge that the city would not interfere
with his worker's compensation claim. 15
Notwithstanding the relief obtained by the plaintiff in this settle-
ment, the court concluded that the council members had "prevailed" in
the action and were entitled to attorney's fees under section 111.07 as
prevailing defendants. 15 6 The court observed that, under the settlement,
all of the plaintiff's relief was awarded by the city and the mayor, who
had been co-defendants in the police chief's civil rights action. The
council members had been merely signatories to the stipulated settle-
ment; they did not contribute monetarily. The court also relied on the
general rule that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the
defendant is considered the prevailing party.157
Finally, the supreme court responded to the council members' con-
tention that, under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes, they were
entitled to recover their attorney's fees in the instant litigation. The
court disagreed. It held that the purpose of section 57.105 was narrow.
The section was meant to discourage "baseless claims, stonewall de-
fenses, and sham appeals in civil litigation," by assessing attorney's fee
awards on losing parties who engage in these activities. 58 In this case,
that provision was inapplicable. The city's defense of the council mem-
bers' attorney's fees claims did not completely lack a justiciable issue of
either law or fact. Thus there was no basis for a section 57.105
award. 59
155. Id.
156. Thornber, 568 So. 2d at 919.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 920.
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